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The authors show that, despite the existence of a Pareto-dominant "good" (no bank run) equilibria, the model can result in a "bank run". An introduction of National Insurance contributions allows to achieve a favorable ebuilibria.
A series of subsequent theoretical research provides an understanding of what factors are important in describing the crisis in the banking sector. Thus, in the paper (Ennis, Keister, 2009) it is shown that the announcement of the bank's commitment to "tough" policy in the case of a run helps prevent bank panics. The more recent work by the same authors (Ennis, Keister, 2010) concludes that the bank pursuing ex post efficient policy payments on deposits can generate intentions of investors to participate in the bank run. The importance of such factors as concentration of the banking system in reducing the probability of "bank runs" was noted in (Temzelides, 1997) . 1 Empirical studies of bank defaults often try to identify the cause of the problem situations with the help of various indicators resulting from the bank statements, macroeconomic and institutional variables. Most of these studies use binary model (probit and logit) specifications.
In the early empirical work (Martin, 1977) , the probabilistic model of bank defaults in the U.S. in the 1970s is considered. On the basis of the constructed models, the author concluded that the ratio of net income to bank assets and the ratio of capital to risk assets have a negative impact on the probability of default. The share of commercial loans and the ratio of written-off assets to operating income positively affect the likelihood of default.
Hwang in his study (Hwang et al., 1997) considers bank defaults in the U.S. in late 1980s.
The main result is that more profitable banks and banks with high net worth were more stable, along with banks with a high proportion of liquid assets.
Banking crises in East Asia and Latin America are considered in the work (Arena, 2007) .
Based on cross-section logistic regressions, the author concluded that the high value of the ratio of liquid assets to liabilities and interest income to assets reduced the probability of bank default, while a large share of loans in total assets increased this likelihood.
The work (Demirguc-Kunt, E.Detragiache, 1998) concerns cross-country studies of banking crises. One of the important results is the negative effect of presence of a system of deposit insurance on the stability of the banking system due to moral hazard. This result goes into contrary to those of the studies listed above by Diamond and Dybvig. A number of articles by Russian authors is devoted to the crisis of 1998 that strongly affected the banking system and the economy as a whole. Styrin in his paper (Styrin, 2005) considered 250 largest Russian banks during the crisis in the framework of binary models. The 5 author found out that the share of deposits in liabilities and the share of other financial assets in all assets significantly increased the probability of bank default, while the share of foreign liabilities in all the bank's liabilities was prejudicial to the probability of default. The author also noted that the largest banks were more resilient to the crisis.
It is worth to mention the paper (Peresetsky et al., 2004) , devoted to crisis of 1998 in Russia, in which the authors used a different technique of constructing the dependent variable in the binary model, responsible for the bank's default. According to estimated models, the authors concluded that the ratio of equity to assets, the share of liquid assets in the total assets and the share of loans to non-financial organizations enhanced the viability of the bank, while the ratio of reserves to assets and the share of long-term assets had a negative impact on the banks viability. A large share of corporate securities in assets increased the probability of bank default.
It is also noted that the inclusion in the model of various macroeconomic variables improved the quality of the models.
Drobyshevsky in his work (Drobyshevsky, 2000) identified factors that caused problems in the Russian banks in [1997] [1998] . With the logistic model, the author found that the proportion of funds in foreign accounts had a positive effect on the probability of survival of the bank, while the ratio of foreign liabilities to assets, the share of deposits in the liabilities of the bank and the quarter growth rate of loans to non-financial sector had a negative effects on the viability of the bank.
2

Problem statement and data description
Analysis of the theoretical and empirical works on bank defaults and macroeconomic environment in the country during the crisis helped to make assumptions about the impact of different variables on the viability of banks in [2008] [2009] . First, we should highlight the importance of the amount of liquid assets in the banking sector. The lack of liquidity in the banking system during the crisis period (the second half of 2008) was offset by the issuance by the Bank of Russia of a large volume of loans to commercial banks, so the possible negative impact of the liquidity ratio on probability of bank default could be offset by this liquidity provision.
The bank's equity, which characterizes bank's stability in the case of increasing the share of pour quality assets, also could be an important indicator for bank default probability.
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The structure of loan portfolio, along with the value of reserves for possible losses that banks accumulated based on the riskiness of their portfolio, also should be considered as important factors for bank viability.
Liability structure could also have a significant impact on the stability of the bank. First of all, we should pay attention to public deposits and foreign liabilities, but the variables responsible for the creation of market debt through the issuance of bonds or notes, too, could have an impact on the bank performance.
In addition to balance sheet variables, we should consider various measures of macroeconomic environment, which could also have an impact on the viability of banks.
The purpose of this paper is an empirical identification of factors, which had an impact The final set of variables for building econometric models was formed on the basis of a set of data provided by the Interfax agency. Variable selection was made with the logic of the crisis and the previous studies that investigated the bank defaults. Table 1 shows the variables used and their expected impact on the viability of the bank. As noted in many studies 4 , the size in terms of assets may be an important factor affecting the viability of the bank. Therefore we decided to include also the square of the logarithm of the assets, thus trying to check non-linear dependence of the probability of default on the bank's assets. Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values of the variables used in the entire data sample. Assets, measured in millions of rubles, are used in logs, the other values are dimensionless. The viability of the bank can be determined by various variables. In work by Peresetsky, bank default could be defined as the realization of one of the possible conditions: license withdrawal, the elimination due to a merger with another bank, or go under the ARCO's control (Agency for Restructuring Credit Organizations). In other works, such as (Drobyshevsky, 2000) and (Arena, 2007) , some of the "economic" indicators of default are used in addition, associated 4 See (Peresetsky et al., 2004) 9 with the value of the share of equity in the assets or shares of overdue payments in the bank's liabilities.
As a definition of bank default in this paper, we consider the fact that at least one of the following conditions holds:
1) the license withdrawal;
2) the transfer of the bank under the control of the DIA (Deposit Insurance Agency);
3) negative equity; 4) the share of overdue payments in the whole volume liabilities is above 3%.
This widened definition of a default can identify ailing banks not only in the event of an actual liquidation or providing them with financial assistance, but also in the more general case of serious financial problems.
In this work, similar to the work of Peresetsky, the specific pool of data is formed from original unbalanced panel data. It is not reasonable to use all the available observations because of the autocorrelation of the observations for a single bank. The algorithm for creating the final set of data is as follows:
1) For a bank that got insolvent at the time t (on quarterly basis), indicators of bank accounts are taken at time t-4 (one year before the date t), and a binary dependent variable DEATH, characterizing the state of the bank, is set equal to one. Thus, a first point in the generated data set for model estimation is: the dependent variable DEATH = 1, and the explanatory variables match those of the bank at the time of t-4.
2) Next, retreating further than a year ago, at the time of t-8 (provided that this period does not exceed the limits of the available data), for bank performance in this period, the dependent variable DEATH is set equal to zero (the bank is still normal functioning in that time). Thus, it is another observation that corresponds to the bank in the final set of data points: DEATH = 0, and the explanatory variables are indicators of the bank performance at the time of t-8.
3) Then, we repeat the previous step, and the value of the dependent variable DEATH = 0 is attributed to bank statement indicators for the periods t-12 (provided that this period does not exceed the limits of the available data). The main tool of modeling the probability of bank default is a binary logistic model:
x is a vector of parameters of a particular point in the pool. Logistic distribution function has the form: Evaluation of this equation is not only on a sample of all banks, but also on a sample consisting only of the big banks. Such division of banks (large and small) is due to the fact that it is the big banks for the most part in classic banking (lending and deposit taking), while among the small banks there are a lot of captives, who are children of some corporations or holdings. In these small banks, there is often no developed branch network, as there is no need to serve a large number of customers. They are don't issue of loans and deposits. Model for a sample of large banks will be distinguished by the absence of variables characterizing the size of the bank in terms of assets.
Results
This section is devoted to the estimation of models and hypothesis testing. Based on the above binary logistic specification, we built a number of models presented in Table 3 .
The first column corresponds to the model that includes all the above variables (Table 1) Let's consider the effect of significant variables on the bank default probability in the built models. Different signs and significance of the coefficients of the logarithm of assets (negative) and the square of the logarithm of assets (positive sign) indicates that large and very small banks bankrupt less than medium-sized banks (models 1 and 5). Medium-sized banks were less likely to survive the crisis, other things being equal.
Significant negative coefficient of loans to households in models 1 and 5 indicates that higher values of this variable reduce the probability of bank default. The reason for this is the fact that not all banks are actively lending to the public, and only sufficiently large and healthy banks with an extensive branch network are doing it. These banks tend to have quality management and many have successfully gone through the crisis of 2008, in spite of the problems encountered with the service and return of loans to households.
Large values of the share of foreign liabilities in all the bank's liabilities also significantly increase the viability of the bank in models 1 and 5. Here again, the reason for this is the direction of the influence, probably the fact that only large strong banks with very good reputation hold foreign liabilities in their portfolios. And one can hardly speak of a direct impact of the size of the foreign liabilities on the probability of default.
The negative sign (models 1 and 5) of the share of non-performing loans in loans to nonfinancial enterprises may seem strange, as they clearly worsen bank performance. The reason is seen especially in how different banks maintain records in their statements. Strong stable banks with a good reputation do not fear to report data on delinquent loans, because this cannot greatly affect the ability of banks to meet its obligations, while banks that are already experiencing problems can restructure outstanding debt of its customers by issuing the repayment of old papers and issuing a new loan in order not to attract too much attention on the part of supervisors. Thus, small banks experiencing problems often publish false information in their reports, and so the share of overdue loans in the loan portfolio of such banks could have a negative effect on the probability of default because of large stable banks true reports.
Only two variables significantly increased the probability of default in models 1 and 5: the share of the market debt liabilities of the bank and the ratio of reserves for possible losses to non-banking sector loans. Market debt consists not only of bonds, but also promissory notes, which are a less reliable payment instrument than bonds. Banks use promissory notes when they do not have the opportunity to issue bonds. Troubled banks used promissory notes to raise their means, which often did not solve their problems. Therefore, a large number of promissory notes accompanied subsequent defaults. One may notice that the big banks in the developed economies almost do not use promissory notes as a way to raise funds.
Consider the variable ratio of reserves for possible losses to non-banking sector loans.
The coefficient of this variable is significant and has a positive sign in all five models (see Table   3 ). Accumulation of reserves, in theory, can contribute to solving the problems of the expected bank run or other problems with liabilities, but this is not always the case. In the crisis of 2008, the banks that created large reserves seemed to experience great difficulties and this reflected in their statements. Accumulation of large reserves for possible losses didn't help to cope with such problems and as a result these banks often failed.
We should note the insignificance of the coefficient of the variable share of liquid assets in all assets of the bank. This suggests that temporary liquidity crisis in the banking sector, which arose with the beginning of the financial and economic crisis, has been overcome by monetary authorities through the provision of loans and gradual devaluation of the ruble, which gave banks the opportunity to invest in the foreign currency, that becoming a profitable asset. We now turn to the results of models based on the sample of the first large 150 banks (by assets), which are presented in Table 4 . As noted above, a cluster of large banks may be of great interest, since almost all the banks in this cluster do classic banking.
One difference from the results for the entire sample is the significance of the coefficient of the equity in models 1 and 5 (Table 4 ). The negative sign indicates that the large values of equity decreased probability of default of the bank during the crisis. This effect is quite logical, since the Central Bank monitors the implementation of standards by banks, including for capital adequacy. Probably, for small banks, Central Bank does this not so carefully, and the impact of this variable on the whole sample vanishes. This corresponds to the insignificance of this indicator in models based on the sample of all banks.
Variable proportion of government securities in the assets is significant at the 10% level in Model 5 and has a negative sign. That is, higher values of this variable reduce the probability of default, other things being equal. This can be explained by the fact that banks with a large share of these securities in its portfolio in the case of problems with could take collateral credit under these securities at the Central Bank that help them ride out the crisis.
The coefficient of the balance on correspondent account is significant and negative in only one model, so this result is not stable. Variable loans to banking system is also weakly significant (with a negative sign) in model 5 and insignificant in model 1.
The effect of the market debt was insignificant. Big banks did not use notes to raise funds, and the effect of the market value of debt on a sample of these banks is not detected.
The influence of other variables is identical to the model built on a sample of all banks.
The share of loans to individuals in the entire loan portfolio negatively affects the probability of default. Even among the largest 150 banks in terms of assets, only very stable banks with extensive branch network were involved in active loans.
The presence of a large share of foreign liabilities in the liabilities of the bank went in line with its good reputation and stability was consistent with a negative impact on the probability of bank default.
Accumulation of large reserves for possible losses on loans increased probability of default among the major banks. Explanation of this fact seems to be the same as in the case with the entire sample: banks with large reserves already had problems or were aware of the imminent worsening of the situation.
It should be noted that in all the models a coefficient of the share of liquid assets in the bank's assets turned out to be insignificant. This can be explained as follows. First, at the time of the crisis there was no explicitly banking panic in which the liquidity of the bank is very important. Second, in case of problems with liquidity, banks could always get funds on the 15 interbank market or take a loan with the Bank of Russia. This situation was different from what it was in 2004, when the Central Bank of Russia was very selective in allocating funds in the debt, and the banks experiencing liquidity problems were likely to cease to exist. Tables 3 and 4 . The tables include a model with the addition of three macroeconomic variables from the above list: the ratio of exports from the Russian Federation to the import, the deposit rate (the average rate on ruble retail deposits with credit institutions for a period of 1 year.) and the change of exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar. The direction of influence of these macroeconomic variables was identical for both samples of banks.
Consider first the deposit rate (model 4). The negative sign means that high rates reduced the value of the probability of default. It does seem plausible, if one compares the situation with the crisis of 1998. In that period, along with rising interest rates banks tried to raise money from the public to be able to discharge obligations. However, in 1998, the public did not believe in the stability of banks (besides, the deposit insurance system did not exist), so the rate increase was not successful in terms of attracting deposits and characterized the intensification of the crisis:
the more banks raised their rates, the more default probability grew.
In 2008, the public trusted more in the banking system and government guarantees than in 1998, so the rates growth was not perceived as panic, and raising interest rates on deposits led to the actual inflow of funds into the banks, which increased bank resources and allowed the banks to avoid defaults.
The ratio of the value of exports to imports in the Russian economy is largely characterized by the value of the exported energy resources, which are major export. High values of this variable caused profitability growth in the economy by increasing the monetary base with quasi-fixed exchange rate and, accordingly, reduced the probability of default of the bank. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of defaults just happened in a period of rapid decline in oil prices, and, consequently, the low value of the ratio of exports to imports. A falling exports tended to weaken the exchange rate, which the Central Bank maintained by selling international reserves, resulting in reduced liquidity in the banking sector.
Change of the value of dollar exchange rate also has the expected positive sign?. This means that with the weakening of the ruble, the probability of default increases. Such influence seems logical, since the weakening of the ruble means a sharp increase in foreign exchange risk due to the increased cost of the return of loans made by banks in foreign currency, which could lead to bankruptcy.
As far as the quality of the constructed models is concerned (1-5 in Tables 3 and 4 Table 3 ), the highest level of Hosmer-Lemeshow test p-value shows its best predictive power in the two groups of binary variable at a time.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to determine the main factors that influenced the bank defaults in Russia during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. To handle this problem, we used logistic models, estimated on a sample of all the banks and on a sample of the 150 largest banks in terms of assets.
According to models that are based on indicators of bank statements, variables such as the ratio of reserves for possible losses to loans to non-banking sector and the ratio of debt-tomarket liabilities of the bank had a positive effect on the probability of bank default. This can be explained by the fact that banks accumulated additional reserves if they had already experienced problems with the quality of its loan portfolio. Accumulation of such reserves, despite its ability to reduce liabilities for income tax, in the end could not save the bank. The positive impact of market debt was probably due to the weaker banks, which usually raised they funds with the help of promissory notes, and such additional fundraising also could not significantly improve bank performance.
High values of variables such as the share of loans to households in the bank's assets and the share of foreign liabilities in liabilities of the bank, met a lesser probability of default during the crisis. The reason for this is seen that only large stable banks, which safely went through the crisis, owned foreign liabilities, and, similarly, mainly large stable banks with extensive branch network were engaged in public lending.
On a sample of large banks, a significant variable was the share of government securities in the assets of the bank, which adversely affected the likelihood of default, which can be explained by the opportunity to take collateral loans on government securities.
Insignificance of such variable as a share of liquid assets in all assets of the bank, which were significant in many preceding studies, could be explained by the fact that short-term liquidity crisis in the banking sector was mitigated by providing loans by the Bank of Russia to the Russian banking sector.
The change in macroeconomic environment was an important factor in the bank defaults.
The increase in the ratio of exports to imports was due to higher oil prices and the stabilization of the macroeconomic situation in 2009, and estimated models revealed a negative impact of this variable on the probability of default. The sharp fall in the ruble characterized the crisis period and went in line with a large number of defaults, which corresponds to the positive impact of exchange rate changes on the bank default probability. Raising deposit rates helped to attract money in banks, including some of the problems solved the shortage of funds, which is consistent with the negative effect of interest rates on deposits in the probability of default of the bank identified in the built models.
These results allow us to formulate some policy recommendations to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the banking supervision and regulation aimed at preventing bank defaults in the event of such crises in the future:
1. Stricter requirements on the classification of bank assets and the creation of bank reserves for possible losses.
2. Limited edition of promissory notes and other debt by commercial banks. 
